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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: State v. Nemeth-The
Community Caretaker Exception to the Fourth
Amendment
ALISON SANDERS*
I. INTRODUCTION
In State v. Nemeth,' the New Mexico Court of Appeals established, as a matter
of first impression, that community caretakifig is an exception to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement 2 and that non-consensual warrantless entry by
police officers into a private residence on information of possible suicide falls within
the community caretaking exception. The court held that such warrantless entries by
police officers are part of a police officer's role as a community caretaker and
consequently, a warrantless entry into a home that passes the community caretaker
test is an exception to the Fourth Amendment.
This Note will examine the decision in Nemeth in the context of the Fourth
Amendment community caretaking exception and the expansion of the doctrine by
the New Mexico Court of Appeals. This Note will further address the development
of the community caretaking doctrine both as it pertains to Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence in general and New Mexico jurisprudence in particular. Additionally,
this Note will examine the decision by the New Mexico Court of Appeals to expand
the community caretaking exception to situations such as that presented in Nemeth
and how this decision will impact both future decisions by the Court and the manner
in which attorneys litigate such cases.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Sandra Nemeth's boyfriend, Mike Wells, called 911 to report Nemeth had just
threatened to commit suicide in the course of an argument with him.4 Officer Lori
Phelps and Deputy Terry Eagle responded to the call. Eagle arrived at Nemeth's
residence and activated a video camera and a microphone. The officers then
attempted to get Nemeth to respond by knocking on the door. She repeatedly opened
the door and told officers to leave, stating she was fine. Nemeth was attempting to

* Class of 2003, University of New Mexico School of Law. Many people were instrumental in the
completion of this Note. I would like to thank Professor Raquel Montoya-Lewis and Professor Leo Romero for all
of their time, effort, and suggestions. I would also like to thank Allison Crist for her time and effort, Glenn SmithValdez, Esq., on behalf of Sandra Nemeth, for his time and information, and my husband for his support, love, and
understanding.
1. 2001-NMCA-029, __ N.M. _,23 P.3d 936.
2. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. "The test of legitimacy under the community caretaker doctrine is whether the officers' actions were
objectively reasonable and in good faith." Nemeth, 2001-NMCA-029 137, __ N.M. at -_, 23 P.3d at 944. The
officer must have a reasonable and articulable belief, tested objectively, that a person is in need of immediate aid,
assistance, or protection from serious harm. Id.
4. Unless otherwise indicated, all factual information is from Nemeth, 2001-NMCA-029, 23 P.3d 936.
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shut the door once more when Eagle stuck his foot in the door and Phelps forced her
way into Nemeth's home.5
Nemeth then told officers to leave unless they had a warrant and the officers
explained they were concerned for her welfare and were there to check on her
because someone had called who was worried about her. Nemeth responded that no
one cared about her. The officers then requested identification but she refused to
comply. She moved into her kitchen and shouted at officers to get out of her house,
saying she was fine and was just angry. The officers moved toward Nemeth until she
was near a kitchen counter from which she picked up a small paring knife. She once
again told officers to get out of her house. Phelps drew her gun and held it in a low,
ready position while Eagle ordered Nemeth to put down the knife. She complied.
Nemeth then informed officers that Mike Wells was on the phone and Eagle
spoke with him briefly, during which Eagle ascertained Nemeth's identity. Nemeth,
sobbing and emotional, continued to tell officers to leave her house. With her
driver's license and identification cards in hand, Nemeth approached Phelps. She
shouted, "Eat this, bitch," and shoved the cards into Phelps's mouth, causing a small
cut and some swelling.
Nemeth then moved to another room and, after further interaction with the
officers, she was arrested.6 Nemeth was charged by criminal information 7 with two
counts of aggravated assault on a peace officer, two counts of battery on a peace
officer, attempting to disarm a peace officer, and battery on a household member.
The trial court denied Nemeth's motion to dismiss and suppress evidence relating
to the alleged battery. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on one count of battery
on a peace officer and on the misdemeanor charge of battery on a household
member. Nemeth subsequently appealed the denial of the motion to suppress and the
verdict of guilt as to battery on a peace officer. The Court of Appeals affirmed,
stating the police officers' actions were within the lawful discharge of their duties
and were constitutional under the Fourth Amendment and consistent with the New
Mexico Constitution.
H. BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
[T]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,

5. Officers later testified that they entered Nemeth's home because they were concerned about her welfare.
Both officers stated that preservation of life is their most important duty as a police officer, and they would not have
been performing their duty had they simply walked away. Id. 8, __ N.M. at __, 23 P.3d at 939.
6. "The recording reveals that the officers' voices throughout were polite and calm, but firm. [Nemeth] was
upset and yelling most of the time, with the exception of a brief period of less than a minute in the middle of the
tape when her voice 'calmed briefly."' Id. 14, _ N.M. at _, 23 P.3d at 940.
7. Criminal Information is defined as "[a] formal criminal charge filed by a prosecutor without the aid of
a grand jury; the information is used for the prosecution of misdemeanors in almost all states, many of which allow
its use for felony prosecutions as well." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 783 (7th ed. 1999).
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and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.8

Generally, searches and seizures within the home without a warrant are per se
unreasonable. 9 However, there are a number of exceptions to this amendment,
including a group of doctrines known as emergency aid"0 and exigent
circumstances" exceptions.
A. The FourthAmendment
The Fourth Amendment provides protection of the rights of the people against
unreasonable searches and seizures and limits the potentially abusive power of the
police. To protect these rights, the Fourth Amendment requires police to have a
search warrant, 2 based on probable cause,' 3 in order to perform a lawful search and

seizure. Generally, the Fourth Amendment prohibits searching a residence without

a warrant unless at the time of the search (1) there is probable cause to believe that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in the residence and (2) exigent
circumstances are present.14 "At the very core of the Fourth Amendment stands the
right of a 'person' to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion"; 5 thus, with few exceptions, a warrantless search of a home
is unreasonable and unconstitutional.' 6

8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The New Mexico Constitution provision, which offers more extensive
protection than the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, reads:
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects, from unreasonable
searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place, or seize any person or thing, shall
issue without describing the place to be searched, or the persons or things to be seized, nor
without a written showing of probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.
N.M. CONST. art. I, § 10.
9. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (involving a situation in which police entered a residence
without a warrant to make a felony arrest).
10. The requirements of the emergency doctrine have been articulated as
(1)The police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and
an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property. (2) The search must
not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence. (3) There must be some
reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or
place to be searched.
People v. Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d 607, 609 (N.Y. 1976).
11. "Exigent circumstances" are defined as, "Exceptions that rely on the premise that the existence of an
emergency situation, demanding urgent police action, may excuse the failure to procure a search warrant. Exigent
circumstances justify a warrantless entry into a residence only where there is also probable cause to enter the
residence." United States v. Johnson, 9 F.3d 506, 508-09 (6th Cir. 1993).
12. "Search warrant" is defined as, "A judge's written order authorizing a law-enforcement officer to
conduct a search of a specified place and to seize evidence." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1353 (7th ed. 1999).
13. "Probable Cause" is defined as, "A reasonable ground to suspect that a person has committed or is
committing a crime or that a place contains specific items connected with a crime. 'Probable cause' amounts to more
than a bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a conviction." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1219 (7th
ed. 1999). Additionally, for "over 75 years, the Supreme Court has stated that probable cause exists when the 'facts
and circumstances' before the officer are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that the
items sought will be found in the place to be searched." Johnson, 256 F.3d at 905.
14. United States v. Morales Cervantes, 219 F.3d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 912
(2001).
15. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 28 (2001) (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511
(1961)) (internal quotes omitted).
16. Id. at 28.
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The Fourth Amendment's central requirement of reasonableness "is the
touchstone of any search,"' 7 particularly within the home, because the "right to
privacy in the home is certainly a reasonable expectation." ' "Indeed, the right to be
free from unreasonable government intrusion into one's own home is a cornerstone
of the liberties protected by the Fourth Amendment."' 9 In order to enforce that
requirement, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth
Amendment as establishing rules and presumptions designed to control conduct of
law enforcement officers that may significantly intrude upon privacy interests.
Commonly, those rules require warrants although the Supreme Court has made it
clear that there are exceptions to the warrant requirement.2 Consequently, the Court
has recognized that "[a]n exception exists for emergencies" and has acknowledged
"the community caretaking function of police officers [that] exists so officers can
assist citizens and protect property."'"
B. The Community CaretakingDoctrine
The Community Caretaking Doctrine is the most recent exception to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement. 2 Other exceptions, including the emergency aid
doctrine and exigent circumstances exception, have at times been confused with one
another. However, case law indicates that the emergency aid doctrine is a
subcategory of the community caretaking exception, a distinctly different principle
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence from exigent circumstances.2 3
The community caretaking exception was first articulated under Washington law
in State v. Sanders,24 which stated, "Police officers may enter a dwelling without a
warrant to render emergency aid and assistance to a person whom they reasonably
believe to be in distress and in need of that assistance." 5 This exception applies
when (1) the officer subjectively believed that someone likely needed assistance for
health or safety reasons, (2) a reasonable person in the same situation would
similarly believe that there was a need for assistance, and (3) there was a reasonable
basis to associate the need for assistance with the place searched.2 6 The Supreme
Court of the United States first addressed this issue in Cady v. Dombroski,27
adopting the community caretaking exception as applied to the search of a motor
vehicle. The case involved a Chicago police officer involved in a car accident
following a night of visiting taverns. Subsequently, the police searched his car,
looking for the respondent's service revolver, and found several bloodied items,
which were later linked to a body found on respondent's brother's farm. The court
17. State v. Clark, 89 N.M. 695, 697, 556 P.2d 851, 853 (Ct. App. 1976).
18. United States v. Paige, 136 F.3d 1012, 1019 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Payton, 445 U.S. at 583).
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001).
21. State v. Menz, 880 P.2d 48, 49 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
22. People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 942 (Cal. 1999).
23. Id. at 933.
24. 506 P.2d 892, 895 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 413 U.S. 433 (1973). In Cady, the Court adopted the community caretaking exception as applied to the
search of a motor vehicle, reasoning that such a search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because of a
concern for police and public safety as well as the diminished expectation of privacy in automobiles. Id. at 447.
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concluded that the search of the Thunderbird was valid, despite the absence of a
warrant, because of "concern for the safety of the general public who might be
endangered if an intruder removed a revolver from the trunk of the vehicle."28
Furthermore, the court stated that while the concern for safety may have been
handled in a less intrusive manner, the fact that it was not does not render the search
unreasonable.29 The Court further stated that the fundamental nature of the
community caretaker exception is that these functions are totally divorced from the
detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a
criminal statute. 30 At the time of the search of the car, the officer was totally
unaware that any crime other than the drunk driving charge had occurred. He
searched the car only to ensure public safety, fulfilling his role as a community
caretaker.3
The community caretaking exception adopted by the Supreme Court has
subsequently been interpreted in several decisions.32 In People v. Mitchell,3 3 the
court recognized that "[c]onstitutional guarantees of privacy and sanctions against
their transgression do not exist in a vacuum but must yield to paramount concerns
for human life and the legitimate need of society to protect and preserve life."34 The
circuit courts, however, have struggled with the application of the exception set out
in Cady.35 In the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, the courts have determined that the
community caretaking exception was intended to apply only to automobiles because
of the lesser privacy attributed to cars. 36 The Tenth Circuit agreed with this
interpretation of the community caretaking exception in United States v. Bute37
where the court stated, "We agree with this line of authority holding the community
caretaking exception to the warrant requirement is applicable only in cases involving
automobile searches."38 This decision was also based on the idea that homes are
afforded additional protections by the Fourth Amendment and, thus, Cady did not
intend to create a broad exception to the warrant requirement.39

28. Id.
29. Id
30. Id. at 441.
31. Id
32. Unless otherwise indicated, all cases discussed herein involve the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.
33. 347 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1976).
34. Id. at611.
35. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
36. See United States v. Pichany, 687 F.2d 204 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding the community caretaking exception
alone did not justify a search of a warehouse in the investigation of a burglary); United States v. Erickson, 991 F.2d
529 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding the community caretaking function did not justify entering defendant's home without
a warrant to investigate a burglary).
37. 43 F.3d 531 (10th Cir. 1994).
38. Id. at 535.
39. Id.
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C. The Community CaretakingDoctrine in New Mexico
The community caretaking doctrine first took root in New Mexico in State v.
Reynolds,' which involved the police stopping a moving truck for safety concerns.
In Reynolds, a New Mexico State Police officer stated he stopped the vehicle
because of safety concerns raised by three individuals sitting on the tailgate of a
moving truck.4 After pulling the vehicle over, the officer asked the driver for
identification as he administered a safety warning regarding the passengers on the
tailgate. The driver produced a valid Florida driver's license but, as the interaction
continued, the officer testified he began to feel a bit unsafe due to the presence of
the three hitchhiker-passengers, the traffic on the highway, and the difficulty the
driver was having in locating the vehicle registration. Based on this feeling, the
officer requested identification from all individuals in the vehicle. Upon obtaining
these, the officer ran warrant checks on all of the passengers. It was determined that
the vehicle was stolen and the officer arrested the defendants.
In Reynolds, the court declared it is appropriate for officers to stop vehicles for
a specific, articulable safety concern.42 The court further stated that part of the
function of police officers is to carry out community caretaking functions to enhance
public safety,43 and on appeal in Reynolds, the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed
the role of the police as community caretakers.'
In the wake of Reynolds, the community caretaking doctrine has been expanded
in New Mexico. Post-Reynolds, in State v. Walters,45 the New Mexico Court of
Appeals stated that "[clase law recognizes three types of police-citizen encounters:
(1) arrests, which require probable cause; (2) investigative stops, which require
reasonable suspicion; and (3) community caretaking encounters."' The first two are
seizures invoking constitutional protections while the third is an encounter involving
no coercion or detention and thus falls outside the Fourth Amendment. The New
4
Mexico Supreme Court reiterated this concept in a later case, State v. Jason L., "
stating, "Arrests and investigatory stops are seizures invoking Fourth Amendment
protections; community caretaking encounters are consensual, beyond the scope of
the Fourth Amendment."48 It has now been recognized, however, that many
community caretaker actions are in fact coercive and therefore do implicate the

40. 117 N.M. 23, 868 P.2d 668 (Ct. App. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 119 N.M. 383, 890 P.2d 1315
(1995). The case reversed the suppression by the Court of Appeals of evidence obtained with the search warrant.
The Court of Appeals suppressed evidence, saying the length of the detention was too long to be reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment. The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed, concluding the stop was valid, whether it was
to enforce traffic laws or to promote safety under the community caretaking function. Thus, the detention to obtain
drivers licenses, insurance, and registration information was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
41. Factual information in this paragraph comes from Reynolds, 117 N.M. at 24-25, 868 P.2d at 669-70.
42. Id. at 26, 868 P.2d at 671.
43. Id. at 25, 868 P.2d at 670. A similar holding was also reached in Apodaca v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't,
118 N.M. 624, 884 P.2d 515 (Ct. App. 1994).
44. Reynolds, 119 N.M. at 388, 890 P.2d at 1320.
45. 123 N.M. 88 934 P.2d 282 (1997).
46. Id. at 91, 934 P.2d at 285.
47. 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856 (2000).
48. Id. at 123, 2 P.3d at 861.
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Fourth Amendment, thus creating the necessity for a community caretaker exception
to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.4 9
IV.RATIONALE
Prior to the decision in Nemeth, New Mexico community caretaker case law
followed previous federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and was limited to
police-vehicle encounters in which the officer's specific, articulable concern is for
the safety of the occupants of the vehicle, not a violation of the law. The court
acknowledged that Nemeth presented a very different case. None of the previous
community caretaker cases involved the entry into an individual's home to render
assistance for a possible suicide, and since the highest reasonable expectation of
privacy is within the home, this case represents an important expansion of the
community caretaker doctrine. The court in Nemeth set out to determine whether the
warrantless entry into a home on the basis of a possible suicide was an appropriate
expansion of the community caretaker doctrine.5 °
A. The Community CaretakerException and Entry into the Home
The court in Nemeth acknowledged that New Mexico has recognized a
community caretaker doctrine as stated in Reynolds.5 The Nemeth court stated that
"the officers were acting pursuant to a 911 call regarding a possible suicide threat"
and "were motivated solely to check on a person's welfare and to assist a person in
need."52 The officers "were not engaged in any sort of criminal investigative
activity" or concerned about criminal activity in any way.53 These actions therefore
fell "within a police officer's community caretaker function, which is, broadly stated,
to render aid and assistance to those in need." 4
The court recognized that other jurisdictions have dealt with the community
caretaker exception in several ways. Some jurisdictions have characterized caretaker
activities as "exigent circumstances," "emergency aid or assistance," or "community
caretaker."55 The court in Nemeth added that a response by law enforcement officers
to a call seeking assistance in regard to a possible suicide inside a home can be
characterized as rendering aid or assistance under either the emergency aid or
community caretaker doctrines.56 The distinguishing features of these doctrines are
very subtle and appear to indicate a meaningless distinction. Hence, the activity falls
within a more generic community caretaking function. The court continued, stating,
[Tihe primary characteristic of community caretaking that sets this function
apart from criminal investigative and enforcement activity is the absence of

49. State v. Nemeth, 2001-NMCA-029, _N.M.
, 23 P.3d 936 (stating that an exception to the Fourth
Amendment was carved out in Cady indicating that not all community caretaking situations are consensual and noncoercive).
50. Id.
51. d 22,
N.M. at ,23 P.3d at 941.
52. Id. 21,
N.M. at , 23 P.3d at 941.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. 1 32, __N.M. at w,23 P.3d at 943.
56. Id. 36, - N.M. at __,
23 P.3d at 944.
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concern about violations of law on the part of the law enforcement officer. As
long as the facts of a particular case meet the test for the community caretaking
function that we set out below, that function can properly take its place in our
jurisprudence as an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement."

B. The Test for the Community Caretaking Exception
The reasonableness principle of the Fourth Amendment governs any intrusion
into a home under a community caretaker exception." The test of legitimacy under
the community caretaker doctrine, based on several decisions from other states,59 is
whether the officers' actions were objectively reasonable and in good faith.
Specifically, the officer must have a reasonable and articulable belief, tested
objectively, that a person is in need of immediate aid or assistance or protection
from serious harm.'
Additionally, the court stated that in order to come under the exception, the
officer must act in good faith, having no pretextual reasons, such as obtaining
incriminating evidence, in entering the home. The sole motivation for entering the
dwelling must be a non-criminal-related community caretaking function, and the
officer can do no more than what is reasonably necessary to determine whether
someone needs assistance and to provide that assistance." !
The Court stated that the conduct in this case fell within the community
caretaking exception because it met the established test.62 The Court concluded that

"[tihe officers' actions constituted a check on the welfare of a person the officers
reasonably believed to be in need of immediate assistance, and a reasonable, limited
effort to determine if they could assist that person."6 There was no indication that
the officers were motivated by any criminal investigation or any criminal behavior
at all. This is purely a public service that fits directly within a police officer's
community caretaking obligations, and thus, the warrantless entry into defendant's

home was valid.'

57. Id.
23 P.3d at 944.
N.M. at __,
58. Id. 37,
59. State v. Carlson, 548 N.W.2d 138, 140-42 (Iowa 1996) (abandoning a subjective aspect to the
reasonableness test under the Fourth Amendment. The court adopted a purely objective test in which reasonableness
is determined on the basis of objective circumstances.); Commonwealth v. Waters, 456 S.E.2d 527, 530 (Va. Ct.
App. 1995) (stating that objective reasonableness remains the linchpin of determining the validity of action taken
under the community caretaker doctrine); People v. Davis, 497 N.W.2d 910, 921 (Mich. 1993) (stating that test
articulated requires a determination of whether the officers possessed a reasonable belief based on specific,
articulable facts that someone was in need of immediate aid).
23 P.3d at 944.
60. Nemeth, 2001-NMCA-029 37, _ N.M. at_,
61. Id. 38, __ N.M.at __ 23 P.3d at 944. Commonwealth v. Waters also states these requirements:
(1) the officer's initial contact or investigation is reasonable; (2) the intrusion is limited; and (3)
the officer is not investigating criminal conduct under the pretext of exercising his community
caretaker function. Police officers have an obligation to aid citizens who are ill or in distress, as
well as a duty to protect citizens from criminal activity.
456 S.E.2d 527, 530 (Va. Ct. App. 1995).
62. Nemeth, 2001-NMCA-029 40, _ N.M. at_, 23 P.3d at 944.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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C. Public Policy
The court also presented a limited discussion of the public policy behind its
decision to expand the community caretaking exception to homes. The court
recognized that officers have a duty to protect and preserve life but also recognized
that law enforcement officers cannot employ this exception to enter homes to
investigate suspected criminal activity under a ruse of community caretaking
pursuits.65
The court clearly limits officers' activities under this exception, stating,
Our application here of the community caretaker doctrine carries with it the
expectation that law enforcement officers will continue to carry on such service,
while at the same time remain subject to judicial scrutiny to assure that their
actions are reasonable and not pretextual, and that their conduct is not outside
the bounds of legitimate community caretaker activity.'
V. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS
The New Mexico Court of Appeals expanded the community caretaker exception
to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement in Nemeth. This marks both a break
from the idea that the doctrine should be confined to an automobile exception 67 and
a clear development in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in New Mexico. 68 This
decision is one that will significantly impact constitutional rights and court decisions
in the future. The community caretaker doctrine is an important exception to the
Fourth Amendment in that it allows police to fully exercise their duty to protect the
citizens in their jurisdiction. However, searches and seizures in the home are still
presumptively unreasonable, unless the proper showing is made69 or the conduct
comes within a "carefully delineated" exception.7" Thus, the decision made in
Nemeth not only recognized the community caretaking exception, it also expanded
it to the sacred area of the home on facts that may not be strong support for such an
expansion. Despite this, extension of the doctrine is likely appropriate on articulable
facts.
A. The Community CaretakingDoctrineIn New Mexico as It Applies to the
Nemeth Case
The community caretaking function of a police officer is to render aid and
assistance to those in need. It is understood that police interactions with citizens are
governed by the constitutions of the State of New Mexico and the United States of
America and people who are emotional do not lose their rights under either
constitution. Although a person may be upset, crying, yelling, and cursing, this
conduct alone does not indicate potential suicide. It cannot be ignored, however, that

65. li.l40-41, - N.M. at -,23 P.3d at 945.
66. Id.
67. United States v. Erickson, 991 F.2d 529, 532 (9th Cir. 1993).
68. Under previous New Mexico jurisprudence, the community caretaker exception applied to police/citizen
encounters involving automobiles. See State v. Reynolds, 119 N.M. 383, 388, 890 P.2d 1315, 1320 (1995).
69. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (requiring warrants to be based on probable cause).
70. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318 (1972).
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this conduct may be illustrative of a serious problem that may lead someone to harm
themselves.
In the Nemeth case, Nemeth's actions of picking up the paring knife, whether she
intended to use it or not," coupled with shoving her license and other cards into
Officer Phelps's mouth while screaming, "Eat this, bitch," could be construed to be
symptoms of a condition that needed to be addressed immediately.72 However, as
is true for other exceptions to the Fourth Amendment, the officers' entry into the
home would not be justified under the community caretaking exception, even if they
were acting only to determine whether Nemeth was in need of their aid because
these events occurred after the warrantless entry into Nemeth's home. Furthermore,
the fact that all of the officers involved conceded that they did not suspect Nemeth
of any criminal offense when they entered her home did not justify the entry,
because they had no evidence at the time of the warrantless entry to indicate that
Nemeth was in need of their assistance. The Nemeth court found that the officers
were motivated solely by concern for Nemeth's safety and not engaged in any sort
of criminal investigation.
Nevertheless, the officers could not be certain why Nemeth initially answered the
door upset, although they were aware that she had an argument with Mike Wells
prior to the appearance of the police and her conduct could have been attributed to
that series of arguments. Additionally, Nemeth could have been upset because of
some completely unrelated event,73 and Nemeth's response to the officers once they
entered her home may have been due simply to the invasion of her home. This can
best be shown based on the facts Nemeth testified to at trial, which were slightly
different than those set forth in the Court of Appeals opinion. 74
Nemeth testified that she and Wells had arranged to meet earlier that evening for
a movie. When Wells did not show up, Nemeth went looking for him and was angry
when she found him because he had been drinking. She walked up to him, slapped
him, and then left. She went home and drank a beer, and then returned to Wells's
home where they argued again. Nemeth took Wells's keys because he was
intoxicated and she did not want him to drive. Nemeth went home, had another beer,
and continued to argue with Wells over the phone. Nemeth then saw a police car
approaching her home and was upset because she felt that the situation between
herself and Wells was a private matter.
Nemeth testified that she is a licensed attorney, is admitted to the New Mexico
bar, and felt the officers had no legal right or authority to enter her home because
they did not have a warrant, probable cause, exigent circumstances, or Nemeth's

71. There is some contradictory testimony between Deputy Eagle and Officer Phelps. Eagle testified at trial
that Nemeth held the knife in her hand but simply stood there while Phelps testified that Nemeth took a step toward
the officers with the knife in her hand. Docketing Statement at 11-12, State v. Nemeth, 2001-NMCA-029, -_N.M.
__ 23 P.3d 936 (No. 20637).
72. Unless otherwise indicated, all factual information in this section comes from Docketing Statement,
Nemeth (No. 20637).
73. The point that must be made is that the facts presented appear to show that the officers had no idea what
the situation was and made little effort to corroborate the information they had. However, being in a potential
suicide situation, the officers may have been worried that if they took the time to corroborate the information given
to them by Mike Wells, Nemeth may have harmed herself.
74. All testimony in this section comes from the Docketing Statement, Nemeth (No. 20637).
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consent to enter her home. Nemeth testified that all actions taken that night were in
defense of herself and her home and she never would have taken those actions had
the officers not entered her home against her wishes. Nemeth also admitted that in
picking up the knife she intended to make the officers leave and she further admitted
that she did not act rationally at all times during the incident. However, Nemeth felt
that while coming to her house and knocking and trying to speak with her was
reasonable, the officers' entry of her home was not.75
Based on this version of the facts, allowing the community caretaking exception
to extend to the entry into Nemeth's home may have been an inappropriate
expansion. Most people would be upset in circumstances such as those related above
and would resent any outside interference, particularly by the police. Further, the
officers sought no advice from mental health professionals, nor did they have any
specialized training or expertise in suicide prevention or intervention. The officers
did not contact family members or Wells prior to entering Nemeth's home and did
not check Wells's credibility before entering the home. Additionally, Nemeth clearly
told officers that she was not a threat to herself or others.76 Finally, Nemeth did not
have any visible injuries and did not appear to be harmed in any way when police
came to her home. When the officers arrived, Nemeth was upset but alive and was
not brandishing a weapon or threatening her own life in any way. In short, there was
little or no indication (other than her upset state) that she intended to harm herself.
However, the Court of Appeals did not adequately address the issue of whether the
police had an objectively reasonable and good faith belief that Nemeth intended or
even threatened suicide.
Moreover, Eagle, one of the officers at the scene, testified that peace officers have
three primary duties under the law: (1) to preserve the public peace, (2) to enforce
the criminal code, and (3) to serve process." Eagle also testified that counseling and
mediating are something officers can do but are not part of an officer's duties.
Furthermore, Phelps, the second officer at the scene, testified that she had no
training in dealing with potential suicide, and the Aztec Police Department's
Standard Operating Procedure did not contain anything specific about potential
suicide calls.78 Therefore, it seems clear that handling potential suicide is not a
specific duty of police officers, and the two officers involved in the case were not
trained in any way to deal with such a situation.
B. Changes in the Community CaretakingDoctrineas a Result of the Decision by
the New Mexico Court of Appeals in Nemeth
Until this decision, the community caretaking exception in New Mexico was
limited to police/citizen vehicle encounters,79 but the court in Nemeth considered the
community caretaker doctrine in a different context: the doctrine as it applies to the
home.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Docketing Statement at 14-15, Nemeth (No. 20637).
Id at 15.
Id at 3.
Id.
Nemeth, 2001-NMCA-029 26, __ N.M. at -_, 23 P.3d at 941-42.
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The Fourth Amendment and the United States Supreme Court have clearly shown
invasion into the home is of grave concern and must be "strictly circumscribed."8
The Court of Appeals in Nemeth referred to the manner in which these types of
activities have been articulated, including community caretaker, emergency aid or
assistance, and exigent circumstances. 8' The court stated that despite different
characterizations, the community caretaker doctrine in some form has taken root in
cases involving
activities other than automobiles or simple public street
82
encounters.

1. Cases Addressing the Community Caretaking Doctrine
The court discussed several cases addressing the community caretaking
exception, including Wood v. Commonwealth,83 People v. Ray,84 and People v.
Ohlinger In each of these cases, the court expanded the caretaking doctrine to
entry into the home and this is a distinct change from previous jurisprudence in
which the Supreme Court implied the doctrine was to apply only to automobiles.

This was evident from Cady,86 a decision that turned on the distinction between the

minimal expectation of privacy in a car and the utmost expectation of privacy in the
home. In discussing Wood, Ray, and Ohlinger, the New Mexico Court of Appeals
emphasized jurisdictions that have allowed the expansion of the doctrine to the
home in certain circumstances, although the cases discussed do not necessarily
suggest application of the community caretaking doctrine to the scenario in
Nemeth.87
2. Cases Addressing the Emergency Aid/Assistance Exception
The New Mexico Court of Appeals discussed state and federal cases in which the
emergency aid or assistance exception has been applied to warrantless entry of the
home. The court referred to United States v. Brown,88 United States v. Moss, 89 State

80. Payton v. New York, 455 U.S. 573, 582 (1980).
81. Nemeth, 2001-NMCA-029 32, _ N.M. at_, 23 P.3d at 943.
82. Id. 33, - N.M. at -, 23 P.3d at 943.
83. 497 S.E.2d 484, 487 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (stating the Supreme Court has yet to decide whether a situation
might exist that would justify a warrantless intrusion into an individual's home under the community caretaker
doctrine, as distinguished from emergency or exigent circumstances. The court in Wood held there was no need to
decide it here because the officers' intrusion into the room on the second floor of the home was not totally divorced
from investigating criminal activity and acquiring evidence and, therefore, could not be considered a caretaking
function).
84. 981 P.2d 928, 938 (Cal. 1999) (stating that entry into the home was for the concern of people inside
when the door was open and the area was in shambles; thus, these actions invoke community caretaking principles).
85. 475 N.W.2d 54, 56-57 (Mich. 1991) (stating that entry into the home was justified under the community
caretaker exception when police shined a light into defendant's bedroom and saw him bleeding and not moving).
86. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
87. In both Ray and Ohlinger, the facts involved indicate a stronger basis for believing emergency aid was
needed than was suggested in Nemeth. In Nemeth, the possibility of suicide was involved; while in Ray and
Ohlinger, there were concrete facts, such as an open door showing an area in shambles (Ray) and a person bleeding
and not moving (Ohlinger).
88. 64 F.3d 1083, 1086-87 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that the police entered the apartment out of concern for
safety. The decision to take a brief look inside the apartment was a reasonable one and the agents remained there
only long enough to fulfill their purpose).
89. 963 F.2d 673,678 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that warrantless entry into the home was only justified if the
emergency indicated immediate danger).
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v. Carlson," Duquette v. Godbout,9' State v. Fisher,92 and State v. Boggess.93 While

the exigent circumstances, emergency aid, and community caretaker doctrines are
often intertwined,' all of these cases involved conduct related not to police duties
of crime prevention and investigation, but to their duties to aid and protect citizens.
The emergency aid or assistance exception is very similar to the community
caretaking doctrine articulated here. To invoke the emergency doctrine, "the person
entering a home must have had an objectively reasonable belief that an emergency
existed that required immediate entry to render assistance or prevent harm to persons
or property within." 95 Application of the emergency doctrine is also subject to
another important limitation: Any search following warrantless entry for emergency
reasons of the type here described must then be limited by the type of emergency
involved. "It cannot be used as the occasion for a general voyage of discovery
unrelated to the purpose of the entry."96
These cases depict how other jurisdictions, both state and federal, have enlarged
an emergency aid/assistance doctrine to include homes, despite the heightened
expectation of privacy our society has in residences. Additionally, the test set forth
for the emergency aid doctrine is strikingly similar to the test set forth for the
community caretaking doctrine, indicating that the two doctrines are not completely
different doctrines and, in fact, may not be distinguishable at all.

3. Cases Distinguishing the Exigent Circumstances Exception
In Sheik-Abdi v. McClellan, the Seventh Circuit stated that exigent circumstances
apply only to whether officers had the authority to enter the premises for the purpose

90. 548 N.W.2d 138, 141 (Iowa 1996) (reiterating that a search is invalid unless the searching officer is
actually motivated by a perceived need to render aid or assistance. Additionally, even though the requisite
motivation is found to exist, until it can be found that a reasonable person under the circumstances would have
thought an emergency existed, the search is invalid. The court also rejected a subjective test.).
91. 471 A.2d 1359, 1362-63 (R.I. 1984) (stating that the emergency exception justified entering a home
without a warrant to determine whether a minor child was in peril. The court stated the officers had reasonable belief
that their assistance was required, there was a legitimate need to search the home to be sure the child was not in
danger, the search must be tailored to meet only the perceived need for assistance and cannot be used as pretext to
gain entry for some other purpose. Further, the court stated it must also be considered whether the purpose of the
search would be frustrated if the officers were required to obtain a warrant.).
92. 686 P.2d 750, 762 (Ariz. 1984) (stating the entry into the apartment was justified by the emergency
doctrine because police had credible information that made it reasonable for them to conclude that there may have
been victims in the apartment whose lives could be saved).
93. 340 N.W.2d 516, 522 (Wis. 1983) (stating, "our prior cases have upheld a warrantless entry into a home
under the emergency rule exception when they involved a set of common circumstances from which we have
concluded that a reasonable person could have believed an emergency existed." The court held the warrantless entry
into the home was justified under the emergency exception based on an anonymous tip that child abuse may be
occurring).
94. For example, the language in United States v. Moss appears to put all three doctrines together:
The circumstances under which warrantless entries for such purposes [emergencies] can be made
are exactly comparable to those which justify warrantless entries under the more commonly
encountered "exigencies." Indeed, they are also frequently referred to as "exigent
circumstances." This particular exigency is expressed as one of reasonably perceived emergency
requiring immediate entry as an incident to the service and protective functions of the police as
opposed to, or as a complement to, their law enforcement functions.
963 F.2d 673, 678 (4th Cir. 1992).
95. Id.
96. Id.
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of arrest or seizure. " The Court of Appeals in Nemeth added that a related line of
cases recognized that emergency situations may arise that can justify a warrantless
entry of a home for purposes aside from arrest or seizure' or the exigent
circumstances exception. The Sheik-Abdi court states:
Our colleagues on the Fourth Circuit recently explained that the distinction
between the aforementioned doctrines appears to be in the perceived function of
the responding officer: a warrantless entry is analyzed as an emergency if
purportedly made incident to the service and protective functions of the police
and as an exigent circumstance if allegedly executed in a law enforcement
capacity."
Sheik-Abdi showed that these doctrines are often mistaken among one another and
emphasized the difference between them. In addition, this case showed that other
jurisdictions have recognized this type of exception to the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement for entry into the home when circumstances are such that police
are rendering aid and protection. Despite this, Nemeth is a case in which the police
were acting solely on what Wells told them. They did not know who Wells really
was, whether he was reliable," or what type of relationship he had with Nemeth.
While this information was not known, under the community caretaking doctrine,
police officers may provide aid or assistance and do what is necessary to determine
if such aid or assistance is needed. This duty may allow police to rely on information
such as that presented by Wells in order to protect citizens. This information can and
should be used to respond to the concern of the caller, but more facts may be needed
in making the assessment of whether to enter a home to determine whether someone
needs the assistance of law enforcement.
The Court in Nemeth also discussed People v. Davis,"° in which the court
clarified the distinction between the emergency exception/community caretaker
exception and the exigent circumstances exception. The court stated the test for the
emergency exception as, "First, the officer performing the search must actually be
motivated by a perceived need to render aid. Second, even if the officer is actually
motivated by this perceived need, the circumstances must be such that a reasonable
person would think that an emergency existed."'O' As this test is very similar to that
for the community caretaking exception, the court consequently agreed that
rendering aid to persons in need, even in a private dwelling, is a caretaking function
of the police."2 The court thus concluded that the community caretaking
exception/emergency exception is not a subcategory of the exigent circumstances

97. 37 F.3d 1240, 1243 (7th Cir. 1994).
98. Id. at 1244 (citations omitted).
99. There is some indication that Mike Wells had been drinking when he made this call to the police. Brief
for Appellant at 2, State v. Nemeth, 2001-NMCA-029, _ N.M._, 23 P.3d 936 (No.20637).
100. 497 N.W.2d 910, 921 (Mich. 1993) (holding that when the police are investigating a situation in which
they reasonably believe someone is in need of immediate aid, their actions should be governed by the emergency
aid doctrine, regardless of whether these actions can also be classified as community caretaking activities).
101. Id. at917.
102. Id.
at 920.
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exception as was indicated in Moss. °3 Rather, the emergency aid/community
caretaker exception is a noticeably different doctrine.
The Davis court stated that when police are acting under the exigent
circumstances exception, they are searching for evidence of perpetrators of crimes
and must show, in addition to probable cause, the existence of an emergency leaving
no time for a warrant and that the premises to be searched contain such evidence or
suspects °4 In contrast, the community caretaking and emergency aid exceptions are
only invoked when the police are not investigating crimes.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals in Nemeth furthered this distinction in quoting
the language in People v. Ray,'0 5 which states, "the emergency aid doctrine is not a
subcategory of the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.
Rather, it is a subcategory of the community caretaking exception, a distinctly
different principle of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.""° Ray showed the manner
in which the community caretaker doctrine is viewed as opposed to the exigent
circumstances exception and the possibility of expanding a community caretaker
doctrine, which the New Mexico Court of Appeals ultimately does.
4. New Test for the Community Caretaking Doctrine
The New Mexico Court of Appeals used decisions from other jurisdictions to
determine that the behavior in Nemeth fell within a general community caretaker
function because the officers entered the home out of concern for a person's safety,
not for any investigative purpose. It may be argued, however, that while the officers
may have been motivated by their belief that Nemeth needed assistance, it is
possible a reasonable person would not believe an emergency actually existed. There
are a number of reasons why someone may inform another person (such as the
police) of an argument," 7 just as there are myriad reasons why a person may be
upset when they open the door or when someone forces their way into their home.0 8
Despite this, one of the reasons a person may inform the police or be upset when
they open the door is the possibility of suicide and, thus, the officers were justified
in responding to Wells's call to see if Nemeth needed help. The duties under the
community caretaking doctrine include the determination of whether a person is in
need of aid or assistance, and coming to the home, walking around the property,
knocking on the door, and attempting to speak with Nemeth were all activities
necessary to the determination. The behavior of Nemeth, including her emotional
demeanor, were additional facts the police could take into consideration in
determining whether she needed their assistance. Based on all of the facts, the police
officers' activities were a reasonable attempt to make this determination. However,

103. Id. at 920; United States v. Moss, 963 F.2d 673, 678 (4th Cir. 1992).
104. Davis, 497 N.W.2d at 920.
105. 981 P.2d 928 (Cal. 1999); Nemeth, 2001-NMCA-029 35, -N.M. at-__, 23 P.3d at 944.
106. Ray, 981 P.2d at 933.
107. For example, a person may be angry with another person and want to cause trouble for them. Thus,
calling the police may have simply been a way for Wells to retaliate against Nemeth for their argument.
108. An obvious reason why Nemeth would have answered the door upset is the argument she had previously
with Mike Wells. Additionally, her upset state could have been due to an outside event, such as a family tragedy,
that could have occurred before the police arrived. Further, many people would be upset if strangers (police officers
or otherwise) forced their way into their homes.
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the facts may not justify the officers' entry into her home because all they had was
a report and the observation that she was upset. Nemeth was not in possession of a
weapon or threatening to harm herself when the police arrived and, thus, while
police response was justified, the entry into her home may not have been.
Based on the Nemeth court's decision that the police conduct in this case fell
within general community caretaking functions, the court established the test for the
community caretaker exception. The test was articulated as, "whether the officers'
actions were objectively reasonable and in good faith. More particularly, the officer
must have a reasonable and articulable belief, tested objectively, that a person is in
need of immediate aid or assistance or protection from serious harm."'" The
standard articulated in the community caretaker test is akin to the standard of
reasonable suspicion stated in United States v. Arvizu." 0 This standard is
substantially less than probable cause; thus, officers acting under the community
caretaking doctrine need not make a "more likely than not" determination that
someone is in need of aid or assistance.
The Nemeth court took aspects of many state and federal jurisdictions"1 to create
the test for the community caretaking doctrine. The test includes a good faith aspect
to ensure law enforcement does not use this exception as pretext to enter a home for
the purposes of criminal investigation.
The court also implemented into the test the idea that police may enter under this
exception only for the limited purpose of determining need of aid and providing
what assistance is necessary. However, these safeguards do not require police to turn
a blind eye to crime once they have entered, provided they met the test set forth
any subsequent arrest is constitutionally lawful and based on probable
above, and
2
cause. 1
While this exception may be a necessary one to deal with potential suicide cases
and other similar situations, it may also be true that the doctrine is essentially
identical to the emergency aid or assistance exception, which has already been
applied to homes.' ' Perhaps the distinction between the community caretaking
doctrine and the emergency aid exception is meaningless and, as some cases have
suggested, should be distinguished from exigent circumstances but should not be
distinguished between one another.' " Regardless of whether the doctrine is referred
to as an emergency aid or community caretaking doctrine, the court in Nemeth

N.M. at __, 23 P.3d at 944.
109. Nemeth, 2001-NMCA-029 137, 110. - U.S..-,-, 122 S.Ct. 745, 750 (2002). This case stated:
When discussing how reviewing courts should make reasonable-suspicion determinations, we
have said repeatedly that they must look at the "totality of the circumstances" of each case to see
whether the detaining officer has a "particularized and objective basis" for suspecting legal
wrongdoing. This process allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized
training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to
them that might well elude an untrained person.
Id. (citations omitted). The reasonable suspicion standard was originally set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,21-22
(1968).
111. Sheik-Abdi v. McClellan, 37 F.3d 1240 (7th Cir. 1994); People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928 (Cal. 1999);
Commonwealth v. Waters, 456 S.E.2d 527 (Va. Ct. App. 1995); People v. Davis, 497 N.W.2d 910 (Mich. 1993).
112. Nemeth, 2001-NMCA-029 38, _ N.M. at_,23 P.3d at 944.
113. See infra section V.B.2.
114. Davis, 497 N.W.2d at 920.
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articulated the officers' conduct as community caretaking and determined that the
conduct in Nemeth satisfied the test set forth. The police officers responded to the
call from Wells informing them of possible suicide and were reasonable in doing so.
The officers knocked and entered the home to check on the occupant, whom they
reasonably believed to be in need of immediate assistance based on Wells's report
and Nemeth's behavior when police arrived. Further, the officers entered solely for
the limited purpose of determining whether assistance was needed and providing
such aid if necessary. This behavior fell exactly within the community caretaker
function and accordingly, since the warrantless entry passed the test set forth here,
it fell within this exception to the Fourth Amendment and no warrant or probable
cause was required. As suggested above, however, the police officers were justified
in coming to Nemeth's home but may have required more information that Nemeth
needed or may have needed their aid or protection before actually entering her
home. Her behavior could reasonably have been due to several causes, not just
potential suicide. However, the officers could not be sure and may have been erring
on the side of caution by entering Nemeth's home to see if she needed their
assistance or protection. Law enforcement officers do not want to stand by idly as
someone commits suicide when they may have been able to do something to prevent
it.
5. Did the Officers' Conduct Actually Meet the Test?
The community caretaking doctrine has required that police actions meet the test
of whether the officer has a good faith belief, tested objectively, that a person is in
or may be in need of immediate aid or assistance or protection from serious harm. 5
On the facts in Nemeth, the police officers were likely acting in good faith. They
were not entering Nemeth's home for any investigatory purpose and did want to
help her if needed. However, the officers must also have had an objective,
reasonable, and articulable belief that Nemeth was or may have been in need of
immediate aid, assistance, or protection from serious harm. In this case, officers may
not have had a reasonable belief that met this test. Nemeth did not show any
wounds, bleeding, or any other sort of harm. She was merely upset and did not want
officers in her home. Despite this, a reasonable police officer may have believed
Nemeth could have required their assistance and, thus, the New Mexico Court of
Appeals applied the community caretaker doctrine to this situation. While the
protective policy behind this decision is commendable, it is a bit troubling that in
future similar cases, anyone may call the police and say a person is threatening
suicide and this will allow police to enter the home without any further justification.
6. Search and Seizure Provisions Under the United States Constitution and
New Mexico State Constitution
In addition, the Court of Appeals failed to adequately address the question of
whether the entry into Nemeth's home was permissible under the New Mexico
Constitution search and seizure provision, which provides greater protection than

115. Nemeth, 2001-NMCA-029

37,

__

N.M. at-, 23 P.3d at 944.
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the United States constitutional provision." 6 The greater protection of the New
Mexico Constitution was recently addressed in In re Shon Daniel K."7 The court
stated, "The protections accorded under Article 11, Section 10 of the New Mexico
Constitution against unreasonable searches and seizures are more extensive than
those provided under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.""' 8
The court in In re Shon DanielK. supported this statement with reference to several
additional cases. These cases included Campos v. State,"9 State v. Attaway, 2 ° State
v. Gutierrez,12' and State v. Cordova.'
In Campos, the court concluded that the New Mexico Constitution imposed a
greater probable cause requirement, stating,
Our constitution and case law lead us to hold that for a warrantless arrest to be
reasonable the arresting officer must show that the officer had probable cause to
believe that the person arrested had committed or was about to commit a felony
and some exigency existed that precluded the officer from securing a warrant.
If an officer23observes the person arrested committing a felony, exigency will be
presumed. 1
Attaway also displayed the additional protections afforded under the New Mexico
search and seizure provision. The court stated that Article I, Section 10
incorporated a "knock and announce" requirement as part of the reasonableness
' The court further stated, "The requirement that officers executing a search
inquiry. 24
warrant announce their identity and purpose and be denied admission is a critical
component of a reasonable search under Article II, Section 10, ' ' 1 25 thus indicating
the greater protections under the New Mexico Constitution.
A similar conclusion regarding the additional state constitutional safeguards was
reached in Gutierrezwhen the court held that the federal good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule violated the New Mexico Constitution.'26 The result, that the New
Mexico constitutional search and seizure provision includes more protections than
the United States constitutional provision, was more thoroughly discussed in
Cordova when the court rejected the "totality of the circumstances" approach in
determining probable cause as inconsistent with the New Mexico constitutional
safeguards. 2' 7
The Nemeth Court failed to address the New Mexico Constitution in this case and
did not effectively address the differences in the requirements under the United
States Fourth Amendment provision and that of the New Mexico Constitution.
Furthermore, under Cordova, the protections of the search and seizure provision of

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

§ 10; see also In re Shon Daniel K., 125 N.M. 219,959 P.2d 553 (Ct. App. 1998).
N.M. CONST. art. n1,
125 N.M. 219, 959 P.2d 553 (Ct App. 1998).
Id. at 222, 959 P.2d at 556.
117 N.M. 155, 870 P.2d 117 (1994).
117 N.M. 141, 870 P.2d 103 (1994).
116 N.M. 431,863 P.2d 1052 (1993).
109 N.M. 211, 784 P.2d 39 (1989).
117 N.M. at 159, 870 P.2d at 121.
Id. at 149, 870 P.2d at I 11.
Id. at 150, 870 P.2d at 112.
116 N.M. at 446-47, 863 P.2d at 1067-68.
109 N.M. at 217, 784 P.2d at 36.
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the New Mexico Constitution'28 are best served if an informant's tip complies with
the veracity and basis of knowledge requirements of Aguilar and Spinelli.2 9 While
the Aguilar-Spinelli test is applied when police officers are involved in law
enforcement functions, it seems that a similar principle may be informative in
situations in which officers are performing their community caretaker functions as
well. The Nemeth court does not discuss whether Wells's call would satisfy the
Aguilar-Spinellitest or a similar inquiry, although it seems obvious it will not since
none of the officers verified Wells's identity, his veracity, reliability, or basis of
knowledge for knowing that Nemeth threatened suicide. This appears to be an
oversight of the Court of Appeals because they simply apply their United States
Constitution Fourth Amendment analysis to the New Mexico provision even though
the inquiries under each are significantly different. However, an Aguilar-Spinelli
inquiry takes time on the part of an officer, and this may not be advisable when a
potential suicide is at issue. Further, New Mexico cases have not indicated that
scenarios like the one presented in Nemeth should be analyzed separately under each
constitution or that an inquiry like the Aguilar-Spinelli test should apply. Despite
this, it seems some such inquiry would aid in the protection of citizens'
constitutional rights.
C. FutureApplication of the Community CaretakingDoctrine in New Mexico
Because the court in Nemeth determined that this situation does fit within the
community caretaking exception, cases in the future with similar facts will also
come within it, even if there is not reasonable support to show that a person is
suicidal.
The purpose of the community caretaking exception is to allow police to
determine whether assistance is necessary, to administer aid if it is, and to allow
police to enter a home on a limited inquiry. The reasonableness of response and
entry under this doctrine is by nature fact specific and, in many cases, additional
facts may be necessary before police entry can fall under the exception. Otherwise,
police may enter a home anytime anyone calls the police and says someone has
threatened to harm himself or herself. No other exception allows such an entry on
so little.' The community caretaking exception may apply to the entry into homes

128. N.M.CoNST. art. I, § 10.
129. The United States Fourth Amendment provision requires a totality of the circumstances inquiry. Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983). The New Mexico provision requires satisfaction of the two-pronged test set
forth in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). Cordova, 109
N.M. at 217, 784 P.2d at 36. The so-called Aguilar-Spinellitest encompasses two prongs:
1) "credibility prong" which assesses the credibility/reliability of an informant. This may be
determined based upon the informant's prior track record of credibility or by corroboration by
police of the details given in the informant's tip.
2) "basis of knowledge prong" which assesses how the informant knows the information he/she
is passing along to the police. This may be determined by asking the informant how they know
this information or by the type of details contained in the tip. The more intimate and predictive
of future behavior the details are, the more likely the informant has a good basis of knowledge.
Cordova, 109 N.M at 217, 784 P.2d at 36.
130. For example, the exigent circumstances exception requires the existence of an emergency situation that
demands urgent police action and can only justify a warrantless entry into a residence where there is also probable
cause to enter. United States v. Johnson, 9 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 1993). The emergency doctrine
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when suicidal situations arise, but only on a good faith and objective belief that
suicide may occur. This is a difficult determination but at the very least, in Nemeth,
police should have verified Wells's relationship with Nemeth and perhaps his
veracity and reliability, particularly because the New Mexico Constitution search
and seizure provision requires this, at least for law enforcement searches and
entries.' 3
VII. CONCLUSION
The community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant
32
What
requirement has grown significantly from its roots in Cady v. Dombrowski.1
began as an exception that applied to police-citizen encounters involving
automobiles has now expanded to reach into the private sanctuary of the home.
While an officer's duty to aid and assist a citizen in need is an important function
that benefits society, any exception to the Fourth Amendment must not trample the
constitutional rights of any citizen. The community caretaking exception is a fair
and useful exception but must be applied to situations in which there is an objective,
good-faith belief that someone is or may be in need of assistance from the police.
Anything less is to expand the exception too far into guaranteed constitutional
rights.
The decision by the New Mexico Court of Appeals in Nemeth brings the
community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment to a new level. The
decision implies that police need little belief and corroboration that someone is in
need of assistance before entering a home to render aid that may be unnecessary.
The Court of Appeals recognized that police must be able to make a determination
whether assistance is needed and, in doing so, may need to respond and enter a
person's home. The entry in Nemeth may have been unjustified, however, as police
may have been able to assess her need without entry. Police observed and spoke
with Nemeth and she repeatedly said she was fine and just angry. Nothing Nemeth
said or did indicated that she was going to attempt suicide. While any judgment in
this type of situation is difficult, the test established by this very court requires that
the officer must have a good faith belief, tested objectively, that a person is, or may
be, in need of immediate aid, assistance, or protection from harm. 133 In this case, the
only facts from which to infer any belief was a call from an unverified source and
an upset woman who didn't want police in her home and, consequently, acted
irrationally at times during the incident. For the community caretaking exception to
be on the same level as other exceptions to the Fourth Amendment,134 more facts in
this type of situation must be present in order to reach the level of a good-faith and

requires that the police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at
hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property. (2) The
search must not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence. (3) There must be
some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area
or place to be searched.
People v. Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d 607, 609 (N.Y. 1976).
131. See Cordova, 109 N.M. at 217, 784 P.2d at 36.
132. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
133. Nemeth, 2001-NMCA-029 37, _N.M. at._., 23 P.3d at 944.
134. See supra note 130.
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objective belief that someone in the home was or may have been in need of
immediate aid or assistance.
Despite the potential problems with expanding the exception to the factual
situation presented in Nemeth, the community caretaking exception, including the
formulation of the test, seems to be a just and helpful exception to the Fourth
Amendment, even though it closely parallels the established emergency aid
exception. Police officers frequently encounter situations in which a person inside
a private residence is or may be in need of immediate aid or assistance from police.
To bar police from entering the home in such situations would not only make a
police officer's job more difficult than it already is but would also needlessly
endanger citizens' lives. Thus, such an exception should apply to the entry of homes
if the facts satisfy the test set forth by the court in Nemeth and create a good faith
belief, tested objectively, that a person inside that home is or may be in need of
assistance from the police.
While the application of the community caretaking doctrine in Nemeth may be
problematic, the decision is an important one because it recognizes that the
exception does allow entry into a private home under appropriate conditions and sets
forth a test to guide officers in functioning as a community caretaker. This decision
also provides a guide for other jurisdictions, lawyers, and judges to follow in the
future.

